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1.1 Scope and aims of the paper 
This dissertation is concerned with the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
South African government’s policy and approach to land redistribution. It reviews 
the willing seller-willing buyer approach to land redistribution and assesses its 
effectiveness and highlights its strengths and weaknesses. This will include an 
examination of its implementation by two other countries (namely Namibia and 
Zimbabwe) in the region that have faced similar land issues. in order to 
determine whether it is an appropriate approach for South Africa. Zimbabwe and 
Namibia are ideal comparisons as they are neighbouring countries (with similar 
agricultural sectors) that are also implementing land redistribution at the same 
time that South Africa is. Namibia, which once formed a part of South Africa 
(South West Africa), is going through land reform at the same time as South 
Africa, while the Zimbabwean process began earlier. The fact that both countries 
also relied on the market-based willing seller-willing buyer principle provides a 
unique opportunity for the South African government to learn from the 
experiences of these two countries, while they still manoeuvre through the 
issues related to the approach. This will enable a determination of whether the 
willing seller-willing buyer policy is an appropriate basis for South Africa’s 
redistribution programme or whether an expropriation-based approach would 
prove to be a more effective option.  
 
1.2 Land as a source of inequality 
It has been stated that land is the primary source of inequality in contemporary 
society and in this regard South Africa is no different. There is a long history of 
social manipulation in South Africa which has resulted in distribution of land 
ownership and access to natural resources based on the promotion of racial 






society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.1 Apart from statutes 
which have directly affected land ownership and access to other natural 
resources, many other legislative provisions have indirectly affected the 
relationship between the majority of its people and land.2 When the 
democratically elected government came into power in 1994 it adopted a land 
reform programme to address the problems that had been inherited from a past 
characterised by a highly unequal pattern of land ownership and wide-spread 
rural poverty. 
 
1.2.1 Historical background to land issues in South Africa 
The land question has always been critical in South Africa. Tensions over land 
began in the colonial era, particularly as Boer Voortrekkers moved inland, 
displacing indigenous Africans as they went along.3 Land became an even more 
central issue during the apartheid regime which used land as a means of 
economic and social oppression of the African majority.4 Historically, white 
settlers in South Africa appropriated more than 90 per cent of land under the 
1913 Natives Land Act, while confining the indigenous people to reserves in the 
remaining marginal portions of land.5 This process forced a large number of 
rural residents to leave the rural areas for urban areas and farms in search of 
work, resulting in a significant number of rural people becoming fully 
proletarianised, while others became migrant workers with a tenuous link to 
land.6  
 
The discovery of minerals, particularly gold in the 1880s led to a demand for 
cheap labour. The obvious target was African labour and the colonial strategy 
                                               
1 MD Southwood The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights: By expropriation, way of necessity, prescription, 
labour tenancy and restitution (2000) 21. 
2 Ibid. 
3 M Barry ‘Now another thing must happen: Richtersveld and the dilemmas of land reform in post-
apartheid South Africa (2004) 20 SAJHR 355, 356. 
4 Ibid. 
5 R Hall and L Ntsebeza (Eds) The Land Question in South Africa: The Challenge of Transformation and 







shifted from promoting a class of African farmers to compelling Africans to 
becoming wage labourers.7 Thus, while colonialism and apartheid systematically 
undermined African agriculture, white farmers, through substantial state 
subsidies and the availability of cheap African labour, were able to develop a 
model of large-scale commercial farming in South Africa.8  
 
1.3 The need for post-apartheid land reform 
In a country like South Africa, where an estimated 84 per cent of the land is still 
held by the white minority, it is important to adopt land policies that are aimed at 
redressing historical and racially-based inequities. While arguments for land 
reform programmes typically revolve around issues of equity, poverty reduction, 
economic development and political stability; land reforms are also seen by 
some as important in contributing to human freedoms, civil liberties and 
sustainable democracies.  
 
It has been suggested that land reform is an appropriate means of 
compensating black South Africans for the harm they suffered under Apartheid 
and expanding black economic self-sufficiency and political empowerment.9 It is 
argued that this group should be compensated with land because their 
dispossession was the source of their oppression, and land redistribution 
redresses the historical inequities caused by such dispossession.10 Thus, this 
argument for land redistribution is based on the idea that the return of land is a 
tangible expression of not only the government’s but also society’s willingness to 
address past abuse.11 
 
South Africa’s land reform programme is conventionally described as having 
three legs: restitution, tenure reform and redistribution. Redistribution, which is 
                                               
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 LG Robinson ‘Rationales for rural land redistribution in South Africa’ (1997) 23 Brooklyn J of Int’l Law 
465, 484. 
10 Ibid at 485. 
11 OL Zirker ‘This land is my land: The evolution of property rights and land reform in South Africa’ 






the focus of this paper, is specifically aimed at transforming the racial pattern of 
land ownership and is widely seen as having the potential to significantly 
improve the livelihood of the rural poor and to contribute towards economic 
development. In this regard, the government’s stated target for land reform is the 
delivery of 30 per cent of white owned commercial farmland to African 
ownership by 2014.12  
 
Since 1994 the South African government has implemented a multi-faceted land 
reform programme that has largely consisted of the provision of grants and other 
assistance to would-be landowners to acquire land through the market. In line 
with its neo-liberal macro-economic policy, the government has based its land 
reform programme on free market principles. Reliance on an assisted land 
market has been said to clearly arise from government’s determination to follow 
a reconciliatory path towards greater social equity. The willing seller-willing 
buyer approach generally denotes a completely voluntary transaction between a 
seller and a buyer and, in the South African context; this transaction takes the 
form of negotiations between landowners who wish to sell their land and 
government officials who act on behalf of the intended beneficiaries of the land. 
 
While redistribution is specifically aimed at redressing past inequality, the so 
called market-based, demand-led approach envisaged by the willing seller-
willing buyer policy has arguably had little impact on the racially skewed 
distribution of land in South Africa. Of the 120 million hectares that make up 
South Africa’s total landmass, 84 million hectares constitute prime, white-owned 
agricultural land. In terms of it’s 30 per cent target, government aimed to deliver 
22 million hectares of this land by 2014. However, by the end of the 2005 to 
2006 financial year, only 3.7 million hectares had been delivered. 13  
 
                                               
12 Department of Land Affairs, A partnership to fast track land reform: A new trajectory towards 2014. 
2006-2009. Strategic plan, March 2006 at 5. 






This paper will discuss the reasons behind this result and attempt to ascertain 
whether the slow pace of land redistribution can fully be attributed to the policy 
itself or to the manner in which it has been implemented by the government thus 
far. This will lead to the determination of whether a different policy (namely 
expropriation) would be a better option. 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
This paper is structured as follows. Chapter two looks at the South African land 
policy in a historical and constitutional context, and is followed by a discussion of 
models of land reform in chapter three. Chapter four considers land 
redistribution in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Chapter four examines the willing 
seller-willing buyer policy in South Africa while chapter six discusses 
expropriation as a solution to the slow pace of land reform. The last chapter 























II. SOUTH AFRICAN LAND POLICY IN A HISTORICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction and historical background 
This chapter discusses the importance of land reform policy in South Africa. It 
briefly discusses the historical background and significance of land issues in 
South Africa and places it within a regional context before examining the 
question of whether there is a recognised right to land and land reform in 
international law. This is followed by a discussion of the Constitutional 
framework for redistribution in South Africa and a brief analysis of the 
Constitutional property clause.  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the apartheid government used land as a 
means of suppressing Africans.14 Land is a primary source of income and 
subsistence, and without land, a person is dependent on others for economic 
survival.15 It has been argued that in addition to economic reasons, there was 
also a political reason for taking the land away from the indigenous people. Land 
rights are intricately connected to political rights. It is difficult to refuse land 
owners the right to vote. Thus taking land rights away from indigenous people 
meant that they were effectively deprived of the means of obtaining political 
rights.16 
 
It has also been suggested that in South Africa, the issue of land cannot be 
separated from apartheid’s policies of “homelands”, Group Areas, housing and 
urbanisation; and that land issues remain the core of South African race politics 
because land is a resource around which racial competition, animosity, and 
                                               
14 Barry (note 3 above) 356 
15 Zirker (note 11 above) 621  
16 JS Dreyer ‘Land reform: A key human rights issue and a challenge for religion in post-apartheid South 






black anger have often crystallised.17 In the name of apartheid, approximately 
3.5 million Africans were forcibly removed from their communities to the 
homelands between 1960 and1983.18 It is not surprising then that issues relating 
to land would take a central and significant place at the negotiations leading to a 
democratic South Africa.  
 
2.2 A regional perspective on the importance of land 
It has been found that many African nations have experienced a resurgence of 
land reform over the last century following the retreat of colonial rule. Land lies 
at the heart of social, economic and political life in most of Africa, but across 
much of the continent there is a lack of clarity regarding property rights and land 
tenure is contested.19 In many African countries, the struggle for independence, 
although aimed at achieving universal suffrage, human dignity, and equal 
opportunities, was mostly to address the land issue.20 Issues of justice based on 
reclaiming lost lands were the central aspect of nationalists’ demands for 
independence.21  
 
Land rights, like all property rights, are socially-mediated entitlements. It has 
even been suggested that the way land use is governed is not simply an 
economic question, but also a critical aspect of the management of political 
affairs.22 The administration of land use is the most important political issue in 
most African countries. One of the defining features of the land rights situation in 
most parts of Africa is the dichotomy between customary land tenure 
arrangements which dominate the African landscape and the statutory systems 
                                               
17 Z Skweyiya ‘Towards  a solution to the land question in post-apartheid South Africa: Problems and 
models’ (1989) 21 Colum HR LR 211, 212 
18 Robinson (note 9 above) 466. 
19 C Huggins and J Clover (eds) From the ground up: Land rights, conflict and peace in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (2005) 2 
20 M Munyuki-Hungwe ‘Introduction to Land and Tenure Reforms in Southern Africa’ in  M Munyuki-
Hungwe (ed) Land reform and tenure in Southern Africa: Current Practices, Alternatives and Prospects 
(2004) 
21 Ibid. 






based largely on western models, which dominate in urban and particularly high-
value areas.23  
 
Land reform is, even in the most stable of countries, a volatile and politically 
challenging process. 24 What land reform is for, who should benefit and how it 
should be pursued are often treated as technical economic questions, but it is 
important to note that at its heart the land question is political- it is about identity 
and citizenship as well as production and livelihoods- and can be resolved only 
through political processes.25 Needless to say, the land question has remained 
unresolved in the post independence period in most countries.  
Although the liberation struggle in South Africa was not overtly fought around the 
land question, as was the case in Zimbabwe for example, there was always the 
expectation that unravelling centuries of land dispossession and oppression 
would be among the priorities of a democratic South Africa.26 
 
2.3 Constitutional entrenchment of a right to access property 
2.3.1 An international law perspective 
The significance of land redistribution is evident when one considers that while 
there is no specific or direct right of access to land in any of the international 
human rights instruments, there are other fundamental rights from which a right 
of access to land can be implied. For instance, article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights27 provides that everyone has the right to own 
property, and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of said property.28 Other 
rights from which the right of access to land can be inferred include the right to 
food and the right to housing.  
                                               
23 Ibid at 9. 
24 C Huggins and B Ochieng ‘Paradigms, processes and practicalities of land reform in post-conflict sub-
Saharan Africa’ in C Huggins and J Clover (eds) From the ground up: Land rights, conflict and peace in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2005) 27. 
25 Hall and Ntsebeza (note 5 above) 13. 
26 L Ntsebeza  ‘Land redistribution in South Africa: the property clause revisited’ in R Hall and L 
Ntsebeza (eds) The land question in South Africa: the challenge of transformation and redist ibution 
(2007) 107, 109 
27 GA Res 217A (III) of 1948 available at h tp://www.unhchr.ch/udhr  






Without land, the majority of citizens of South Africa who live in rural areas 
would not be able to feed themselves and their families or provide shelter for 
themselves. Thus  
[l]and has value not only for food and market crops, but also for the non-commoditised 
resources it offers poor people; among these, grazing, firewood, building and craft materials as 
well as providing medicinal herbs.29 
 
It has been argued that it may even be said that without land the right to life itself 
and to human dignity would be meaningless. This argument is in line with what 
is referred to as the social function of property, which is characterised by issues 
such as those of fairness, equity and justice in access to land.30  In this line of 
thinking, there are legitimate grounds for interference with existing property 
rights in order to serve social functions.31  
 
Equally supportive of a right of access to land is the right to development, which 
is understood to be an inalienable right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realised.32 Article 6 of the United Nations Declaration on 
Social Progress and Development33 provides that social progress and 
development require participation of all members of society in productive and 
socially useful labour and the establishment in conformity with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and with the principles of justice and the social function 
of land, of forms of ownership of land and the means of production which 
preclude any kind of exploitation of man, ensure equal rights to property for all 
and create conditions leading to genuine equality among people.34 Thus, the 
Declaration recognises the social functions of property including land and calls 
                                               
29 C Walker ‘Piety in the Sky? Gender Policy and Land Reform in South Africa’ in Razavi (ed) Agrarian 
Change, Gender and land Rights (2003)117. 
30 Land Rights, An Overview, at 278. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Article 1 Declaration on the Right to Development GA Res 41/128 of 1986 
33 GA Res 2542 (XXIV) of 1969 available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/progress.htm  






for land ownership that ensures equal rights to property for all.35  The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women36 
has also been interpreted as protecting the rights of women to have access to 
property as well as to agrarian development initiatives.37 
 
It can thus be concluded that international law requires states to carry out land 
reforms that lead to access to land for their people and that ensure a decent 
existence. At a minimum, all people have a moral right to have enough property 
to enable them to survive or to lead a dignified existence. If they do not have it, 
the state has the obligation to provide it.  
 
2.3.2 Constitutional framework for redistribution 
In 1994, the first democratically elected government committed itself to the 
Reconstruction and Development (RDP) as a policy framework to achieve a 
broad transformation of South African society. This programme was seen as a 
statement of intent for government as well as the private sector, NGOs, and 
local communities.38 The overall goal of the RDP is to promote a fundamental 
transformation of the social, economic and moral foundations of South African 
society. Land reform is the third largest element of South Africa’s RDP 
policies.39 The RDP identifies national land reform the central and driving force 
of rural development, and envisages that such a programme would effectively 
address the injustices of forced removals and the historical denial of access to 
land.40 It further required the government to build the economy by generating 
large-scale employment, increasing rural incomes and eliminating overcrowding 
as part of the land reform programme.41 
                                               
35 Article 17 (d) and 18 (b) 
36 GA Res 34/180 of 1979 available at ht p://www.unhchr.Ch/html/menu3/b/e1cedaw.htm  
37 Article 14 (2) (h). 
38K Deininger and J May ‘Is there scope for growth with equity? The case for land reform in South Africa’ 
(2000) CSDS Working Paper 29, School of Developmental Studies. University of Natal, Durban at 7.  
39 Ibid. 









In general, land reform is defined as “the redistribution of property or rights in 
land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers”.42 There are 
three main types of land reform, namely, land redistribution, land tenure and 
land restitution, and all are enshrined in section 25 of the Constitution. The three 
elements are complementary parts of a comprehensive approach to deal with 
the legacy of apartheid and establish the basis for a productive development of 
a diverse rural sector in South Africa.43  
 
Land redistribution, which is the focus of this paper, is dealt with in section 25 (5) 
of the Constitution. As stated above, land redistribution refers to the acquisition 
of land by the state for purposes of distribution to those who have no land or 
who have inadequate access to land.44 This section of the property clause 
imposes a positive obligation on the state to enhance accessibility to land. It also 
creates a socio-economic right for those in need of land to call on the state to 
act and make land accessible.45 This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others where, 
with regard to the right to housing, it stated that ‘[t]he rights need to be 
considered in the context of the cluster of socioeconomic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. They entrench the right of access to land, to adequate housing and 
healthcare, food, water and social security’.46 The Constitutional Court further 
stated that ‘[t]he state must also foster conditions that enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis. Those in need have a corresponding right 
to demand that this be done’ Thus, it is argued that although the Constitution 
does not expressly define access to land as a right, the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted it as such.47. 
 
                                               
42 Zirker (note 11 above) 634. 
43 Deininger and May (note 38above) 9. 
44 S Rugege ‘Land Reform in South Africa: An Overview’ (2004) 32 Int’l J. Legal Info 283 available at 
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/files/LandreforminSouthAfrica.pdf at 7. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)  







2.4 The South African property clause  
There was considerable controversy over the inclusion of a property clause in 
the South African Interim Constitution. This was marked by fears that the clause 
would either entrench existing property rights too strongly or that it would 
undermine existing property rights for the sake of land reform.48 However, in the 
end, parties at the multiparty negotiations agreed to a property clause protecting 
existing rights while allowing the state to expropriate private property subject to 
the payment of compensation. This provision was retained and expanded in 
section 25 in the final Constitution.49  
 
Section 25 comprises two parts. The first part, subsections 1 to 3, aims to 
protect existing property rights and delimits the scope of that protection.50 The 
second part, subsections 4 to 9, deals largely with land reform.51 The 
                                               
48 E Lahiff and S Rugege ‘A critical assessment of land redistribution policy in the light of the Grootboom 
judgment’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 279, 280 
49 Ibid. 
50 Section 25 (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
  (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application- 
  (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
  (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including- 
  (a) the current use of the property; 
  (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
  (c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
  (e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
 
   51 Section 25 (4) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and 
  (b)  property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 






Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA t/a WESBANK v Minister of 
Finance,52  stated that section 25 “has to be seen both as protecting existing 
private property rights as well as serving the public interest, mainly in the sphere 
of land reform but not limited thereto, and also as striking a proportionate 
balance between these two functions”.53 Thus, section 25 strikes a balance 
between the interests of property holders and the general public interest. It also 
empowers the state to redress the injustices of the past through redistribution of 
land and other natural resources to the advantage of the previously deprived.54 
 
The South African Constitution has been described as a transformative 
constitution because it was designed to heal the divisions of the past and 
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights, and to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the 
potential of each person.55 Land reform is a major means of attaining the goals 
of social justice and economic progress in South Africa. 56 It is critical not only in 
terms of providing historical redress for centuries of settler dispossession, but 





                                                                                                                                
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures 
to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisi ns of this section is in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36 (1). 
 (9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to insubsection (6). 
 
 
52 First National Bank 2002 (4) SA 798 (CC)  
53 First National Bank at 794C. 
54 Ntsebeza (note 26 above) 281. 
55Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.  
56 Zirker (note 11 above) 634. 
57 WD Thwala ‘land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa’ (2003) available at 






2.4.1 Constitutional endorsement of redistribution 
The Constitution expressly manifests the moral, social and economic bases for 
rural land redistribution by empowering the government to redistribute land.58 
Furthermore, it specifies the mechanisms by which to implement land 
redistribution (namely through government expropriation and by legislative 
action). By acknowledging the adverse social conditions caused by land 
dispossession, the Constitution not only authorises legislative action, but also 
manifests the expectation of the South African people that parliament will 
actually take legislative action. This intent is reflected in the wording of section 
25(5) of the Constitution which provides that “the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis”. 
Furthermore, section 25(8) of Constitution states that “no provision of this 
section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past 
racial discrimination”. Consequently, it can be argued that these provisions 
unambiguously contemplate proactive steps by the legislature and other 
governmental bodies to implement land reform and address the harms that 
emanated from land dispossession.59 Land redistribution is necessary to create 
the just and united South Africa that is envisioned by the Constitution. It has 
been suggested that although other forms of restitution may ease poverty, 
compared to land redistribution, they would probably do little to change 
inequality between the races and the structure of power relations.  
 
2.5 A brief analysis of the South African property clause  
Section 25 reads as follows: 
 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application- 
  (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
                                               
58 Zirker (note 11 above) 640. 






  (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner 
of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just 
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including- 
  (a) the current use of the property; 
  (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
  (c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
  (e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
 (4) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and 
to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; 
and 
  (b)  property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of 
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act 
of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other 
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of 
past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section 
is in accordance with the provisions of section 36 (1). 
 (9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
 
 
Section 25 (1) is negatively phrased and does not guarantee a right to acquire 
land or other property. A question may arise as to how to interpret Section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. What meaning should be attached to the notion that ‘no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’? What amounts to ‘arbitrary 
deprivation of property’?60 Judge Didcott has cautioned that what a Bill of Rights 
“cannot afford to do… (is) to protect private property with such zeal that it 
entrenches privilege and makes it, difficult for the country’s wealth to be shared 
more equitably”.61 Ntsebeza has also questioned whether this clause can be 
interpreted to obstruct the government’s “urgent task of social or economic 
                                               







reform”.62 It is submitted that the wording of the other subsections provides a 
clear answer. 
 
Section 25(5) suggests that it merely puts an obligation on the state to pass 
legislation, design and implement a programme that is reasonable within its 
available resources.63 The Constitutional Court has indicated that the negative 
phrasing of the right does not detract from its efficacy. In Ex Parte Chairperson 
of the Constitutional Assembly In re: Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa64 the Court confirmed that the negative formulation 
protects the right to acquire and hold land, albeit implicitly.   
 
In other words, the section has both a passive and positive aspect to it. The 
passive aspect potentially allows it to be used as a defence by the state when 
challenged by opponents to its land redistribution programme.65 The positive 
aspect requires the state to comply with the obligation to create conditions that 
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.66 Thus, it has been 
argued that: 
 
Any constitutional challenge to social reform legislation or action will be met, at least in 
part, by reliance on the social and economic rights in the Constitution. The land rights in 
section 25 are a very important counter-weight to the constitutional entrenchment, in that 
section, of existing property rights. Social and economic rights can therefore provide 
constitutional authority or constitutional protection for legislation and administrative 
action.67 
 
It is significant to note that “public interest” is specifically defined in section 25 
(4) of the Constitution to include the nation’s commitment to land reform and to 
reforms to bring equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources. Section 
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25 (4)(a) of the Constitution puts it beyond doubt that expropriation for purposes 
of land reform, which benefits individuals and communities rather than the state 
or the general public, can be justified in terms of section 25(2).68 As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, this is significant because it specifies and 
legitimises the state’s ability to expropriate land not only for “public purposes” 
such as the building of public infrastructure, but also facilitates the expropriation 
of land for redistributive and transformative purposes.  
 
Rights to land reform are entrenched in Section 25 in subsection (5), (6) and (7) 
of the Constitution. These subsections map onto the ‘three legs’ of the land 
reform programme embarked on in 1995 under the auspices of the interim 
Constitution.69 Subsection (7) refers to the restitutions claims process, 
subsection (6) refers to land tenure reform and subsection (5) recognises a 
socio-economic right to land redistribution.70 Section 25 (8) also contains an 
insulation which attempts to protect the goal of land reform by stating that no 
provision in section 25 may impede the state from taking legislative and other 
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the 
results of past racial discrimination, provided that it is in accordance with the 
general limitations clause in section 36. Cumulatively, these subsections 
counter-balance the entrenchment of existing property rights. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Land reform is critical to transforming South African society. This chapter has 
shown that international law recognises the right of access to land. It has also 
shown that both international law and the South African Constitution recognise 
the obligation of the state to undertake land reform and redistribution to facilitate 
access to land. Furthermore, the South African Constitution manifests the moral, 
economic and social bases for redistribution, and this indicates it support for any 
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initiative that government takes to achieve this end. The next chapter will 
discuss redistributive reform models. The discussion in this chapter will focus on 
market-based reform models, as this is the basis upon which the willing seller-
willing buyer policy (to be discussed in chapter five) is premised.  

































III. MODELS OF LAND REFORM  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the issues of the importance of land and of 
access to property and the rights associated with it in the context of 
international, regional and constitutional frameworks, and found that the South 
African constitution not only adequately recognises the importance of land 
redistribution, but also specifically requires it. This chapter considers arguments 
for land reform programmes, and also discusses the merits of redistributive land 
reform. Specific redistributive reform models are also discussed, focusing mainly 
on the market-based model, as this is the model that has been adopted as a 
basis of the South African government’s redistributive reform policy. 
 
3.1.1 The significance of land reform 
Although it is not itself a sufficient guarantee of economic development, it has 
been argued that land reform is a necessary condition for a more secure and 
balanced society.71 Providing poor people with access to land and improving 
their ability to make effective use of the land that they occupy are central to 
reducing poverty and empowering them and their communities.72 In southern 
Africa, land reform takes on a special resonance because of the history of land 
expropriation and liberation struggles.73 It has been argued that in South Africa 
today land continues to be linked to identity and citizenship in complex and 
shifting, situation-specific ways.74 Politically, it carries a sometimes latent, 
currently more overt, (yet always potent) emotional and symbolic appeal in 
national debate about inequality and redress.75 At the local level it resonates 
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powerfully with those living on the margins, although the narrative of local-level 
loss and redress encounters complications in the form of competing claims to 
land and contested outcomes.76  
 
Governments in post-colonial states have found themselves under particular 
pressures with regard to the land reform that they choose to implement. They 
have had to consolidate their newfound power, take control of land for 
development purposes, respond to the interests of traditional and local elites, 
and meet the needs of the majority of the rural poor.77 In Africa there has been a 
lot of continuity from colonial to post-colonial land reforms. The reasons for this 
continuity were the weak nature of many post-colonial states, constitutions that 
preserved existing institutions and laws, the extent and influence of foreign 
investments, and the need to earn foreign exchange.78  
 
3.2 Redistributive land reform and its merits 
It has been said that land reform is about redistributing land ownership from 
large private landowners to small peasant farmers and landless agricultural 
workers and that it is concerned with a redistribution of wealth.79 Redistributive 
reform has been defined as a public policy that changes the relative shares 
between groups in society.80 It is understood that, to be truly redistributive, land 
reform must effect on a pre-existing agrarian structure a change in ownership of 
and/or control over land resources and such a change must flow strictly from the 
landed to the landless and land-poor classes or from rich landlords to poor 
peasants.81 Here “ownership” and/or “control over land resources” means the 
effective control over the nature, pace, extent and direction of surplus production 
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and extraction, and the disposition of such farm surplus.82 In other words, it aims 
to create purposive change that can result in the improvement of the situation of 
the landless rural poor. Such a “purposive change” or “reform” is inherently 
relational: it must result in a net increase in poor peasants’ power to control land 
resources with a corresponding decrease in the share of power of those who 
used to have such power over the same land resources and production 
processes. In fact, land redistribution is essentially power redistribution.83 
 
Redistributive land reform or privatisation of state land and farm restructuring 
can be justified from a perspective of equity and broader economic growth as 
well as based on the goal of increasing agricultural productivity.84 With respect 
to equity, the possibility that access to even small amounts of land can provide 
an important safety net and that ownership, as compared to renting of land, 
provides strong incentives for investment has often formed a key element to 
justify the contribution of land reform to poverty reduction.85  
 
One of the strongest arguments for redistributive land reform is that it can create 
an environment for growth in agricultural production that will in turn support 
broader economic growth and have a positive impact on poverty reduction.86 
Such arguments are supported by information showing that countries with a 
more equitable distribution of land tend to have higher levels of economic 
growth, while high levels of land concentration are often associated with less 
efficient resource utilisation. 87 
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3.3 Methods of redistributive land reform 
There are two main methods of redistributive land reform that have been 
employed over the years in different countries. These are state-led land reforms 
and the more common market-based land reforms. This chapter focuses on 
market-based land reform, as this is the basis of the willing seller-willing buyer 
principle employed by the South African land policy which will be discussed in 
next chapters. 
 
3.3.1 Market-based land reform 
The primary mode of redistributive land reform over the last decade has been 
market-based land reform and debates have increasingly revolved around the 
merits and disadvantages of this approach.88 The market-based approach has 
particularly been pushed by the World Bank on the basis that this is the only 
form of land reform that is compatible with its economic policies and those of the 
International Monetary Fund. The market-based approach has been bolstered 
by critiques of the state-led reform programmes of the past.89 Fiscal arguments 
against state-led land reforms suggest that they are supply-driven and lead to 
economic inefficiency and they tend to be too expensive as the beneficiaries do 
not contribute and the state has to pay for the land and other support services. 
In addition, the bureaucracies necessary for implementation consume a 
substantial portion of the budget, thus states has often ended up paying more 
than market value for land.90 
 
In the face of these critiques, it has been claimed that the market-based land 
reform model offers an efficient way to enhance equity in asset distribution.91 
The key features of the ‘market-led’ land reform model, according to Borras, are: 
landlord cooperation in the form of voluntary land sales (encouraged by payment 
of full market price); production of ‘viable farm plans’ before land is purchased; 
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and programme financing through the flexible provision of loans and grants.92 
Essential to the market-based approach is the liberalisation of the agricultural 
sector to remove distortions in various land and agriculture-related markets, 
especially those that favour or have been captured by large farmers and elites. 
Pro-market economists argue that liberalisation will lead to a de-concentration of 
landholdings since distortions have favoured land-holdings larger than the 
optimal size.93 
 
Proponents of market-based land redistribution acknowledge that the land 
market cannot be expected to lead to an efficiency-enhancing redistribution of 
land because poor family farmers who do not have much equity cannot acquire 
land even if they have access to mortgage credit. This is because market prices 
are, for a range of reasons, higher than the production value of land. Therefore, 
the role of the state in facilitating land purchases at market prices is to provide a 
grant to subsidise the buyer, thus providing the equity that the poor do not 
have.94 Another key element of the market-based approach is the self-selection 
of beneficiaries who are best equipped to make good use of the land. Strategies 
to facilitate this self-selection are a demand-led approach, which only responds 
to those who request land, and requires potential beneficiaries to work as a 
group.95 It is assumed that applicants in a group will know each other and 
therefore exclude those who they know are less likely to be effective members 
of the group. Requiring beneficiaries to contribute is suggested to ensure that 
only those with commitment are involved, while also encouraging a sense of 
project ownership.96 Financing of land redistribution in a market-based system is 
to be in the form of beneficiary contributions and government grants and loans. 
Economists argue that the provision of grants rather than subsidies on loans and 
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other inputs will have less of a distorting effect on the economy and will be more 
easily managed and transparent.97 
 
3.4 Market-based reform in South Africa 
As noted in Chapter two the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) policy framework envisaged that the land redistribution programme would 
realise its objectives by combining market and non-market mechanisms to 
provide land.98 This was later confirmed in the White Paper on South African 
Land Policy, which stipulated that redistributive land reform would be largely 
based on willing seller-willing buyer arrangements, where government assists in 
the purchase of land but, in general, not in the capacity of the buyer or owner.99 
According to the White Paper government would make land acquisition grants 
available and also support and finance the required planning process.100 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began by discussing the significance of land reform as a means of 
resolving issues of poverty reduction, economic development and equity and 
found that land reform could be said to be a necessary condition for a secure 
society. The discussion of market based redistributive reform also emphasised 
the fact that redistributive reform not only concerns the redistribution of land, but 
also pertains to the redistribution of societal wealth and power. While it has been 
claimed that market-based land reform models offer an efficient way to enhance 
equity in asset distribution, the effectiveness of such a model in the South 
African context is questionable. This will be demonstrated in the following 
chapter which will examine the use of market-based redistributive reform in 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, and will determine whether South Africa can learn from 
their experiences with market-based reforms.  
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IV. LAND REDISTRIBUTION AS EXPERIENCED IN ZIMBABWE 
AND NAMIBIA  
 
4.1 Introduction and rationale for comparison with Zimbabwe and Namibia  
The previous chapter considered the significance of redistributive land reform, 
and was focused on the market-based model of redistributive reform, which 
characterises the South African government’s current reform policy. As stated in 
the introduction in chapter one, the main aim of this chapter is to examine the 
manner in which Zimbabwe and Namibia have dealt with the issue of post-
independence land redistribution, and whether there is anything to be learnt 
from their experiences regarding the appropriateness of the willing seller willing 
buyer policy as a tool for land redistribution. The discussion will argue that the 
willing seller-willing buyer approach is not suited to fast land redistribution in 
South Africa, and that the fact that both Zimbabwe and Namibia abandoned it for 
expropriation strongly suggest that South Africa should do the same. 
 
A distinguishing aspect of the colonisation process in southern Africa was the 
expropriation of land from the indigenous peoples.101 However, it was mainly in 
the white-ruled colonies that land expropriation culminated in a more or less 
permanent division of ownership along racial lines.102 This is particularly the 
case in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, where the white settlers seized 
prime land and pushed the indigenous black populations onto overcrowded and 
often inferior lands.103 At least until recently, all three countries have shared a 
‘dualistic’ agrarian structure, in which significant white populations owned or 
operated most high-value agricultural land and were engaged in commercial and 
export-oriented agriculture, alongside reserves characterised by overcrowding, 
substantial poverty and landlessness.104  Furthermore, white economic elites in 
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the region were also often able to codify their gains when they transferred 
political power to the black majority. Thus, the focus of land reform in these 
former white settler colonies has very reasonably been on the redistribution of 
white commercial farmland to black rural people. 105  
 
4.1.1 Brief background to Zimbabwe and Namibia  
In Zimbabwe and Namibia, occupation and land expropriation occurred almost 
simultaneously in the closing decade of the 19th century. This was followed by 
the consolidation of white commercial farming in the next 40 years, while 
indigenous small-scale farmers were confined to or allocated infertile and drier 
land with little or no infrastructure.106 By the middle of the 20th century, the 
distinctive patterns of white commercial farming and communal farming were 
clear.  
 
In Namibia’s case, it has been estimated that by 1925, a total of just 2.8 million 
hectares of land south of what was known as the Police Zone (a term used by 
both the German and South African colonial policies to distinguish between two 
areas in the country) accommodated a black population of 11 740 people, while 
7.4 million hectares were available for 1 106 white settlers.107 Overall, based on 
inequitable land ownership, white farmers in Namibia possessed about 50 per 
cent of agricultural land while black farmers were confined to a meagre 25 per 
cent of agricultural land.108  
 
In colonial Zimbabwe, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 allocated a greater 
proportion of the better land to white farmers and made provision for evicting 
indigenous farmers to drier and infertile agro-ecological regions.109 The Act set 
aside 51 per cent of land to a few thousand white farmers (who then comprised 
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a mere 5 per cent of the population) and prohibited Africans from owning or 
occupying lands in designated white areas.110 At independence in 1980 and 
1990 respectively, land ownership in both Zimbabwe and Namibia remained 
deeply inequitable. The political symbolism of land in the liberation struggles in 
Zimbabwe and Namibia was strong, owing to the painful memories of its loss 
under colonialism. Therefore, in both countries, land featured prominently in 
negotiations for independence.111 
 
4.2 Land reform in Zimbabwe 
4.2.1 Legal framework for land reform in Zimbabwe 
There can be no doubting the centrality of the land issue in Zimbabwe both 
before and after independence. The great disparity between blacks and whites 
in terms of land ownership has pushed property from the allegedly inaccessible 
realm of the ‘law’ into the public arena of ‘politics’.112 The legal framework for 
land reform in Zimbabwe is defined by the Constitution, as well as by a number 
of statutes. Constitutional provisions of relevance to land reform are the result of 
attempts by the Government of Zimbabwe over the last 20 years to deal with the 
unequal and racially skewed distribution of land and wealth. Despite its many 
democratic tenets, the Constitution that ushered Zimbabwe to independence in 
1980 gave no hope for an immediate rectification of that legacy.113  
 
The original wording of Section 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe  forbade the 
compulsory acquisition of property “of any description” unless it was “reasonably 
necessary” for a variety of purposes, including agricultural settlement, land 
reorganization or the relocation of displaced persons; and the payment of 
“prompt and adequate” compensation assessed on the basis of market 
principles. Persons whose properties had been compulsorily acquired were free 
to remit the compensatory sum in any currency and to any country of their 
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choice without paying any taxes or other levies. In addition, Section 52 (3) (b) (i), 
read together with subsection (4) of that Constitution stipulated that provisions 
concerning fundamental rights (which included the property rights spelled out in 
Section 16) could not be amended for 10 years without an affirmative vote of all 
the members of the National Assembly – a body that guaranteed 20 seats to 
Zimbabwe’s white population during these first 10 years. These constitutional 
stipulations effectively blocked any meaningful programme of land reform and 
resettlement for at least the first 10 years of national sovereignty unless land 
was available on the open market.114 
 
When Section 52 of the Constitution lapsed in 1990, the Government amended 
Section 16115 to prescribe new conditions for expropriation of property. These 
were “reasonable notice” of an acquisition, payment of “fair compensation within 
a reasonable time” (rather than “prompt and adequate” compensation), and an 
order of confirmation of acquisition within 30 days if such acquisition were 
contested. However, this amendment did not change the requirement of 
compensation. 
 
The reluctance of white commercial farmers to offer land at reasonable prices in 
the market continued throughout the 1990s and, despite pledges at the 1998 
Donor Conference, donor support for land purchases also continued to lag 
behind demand. Given the political pressures for reform driven by sporadic land 
invasions, the Government introduced a new provision in the Constitution 
(section 16A)116 which provided, inter alia, that where agricultural land is 
compulsorily acquired for “the resettlement of people in accordance with a 
programme of land reform”, the obligation to pay compensation for land lies with 
the United Kingdom as the former colonial power, and the obligation of the 
Government of Zimbabwe is limited to the payment of compensation only for 
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improvements. In effect, unless proof could be shown that the land acquired had 
been purchased, the Government’s overriding compensation obligation was 
limited to improvements on the land at the time of acquisition. This is the current 
constitutional position. 
 
 4.2.2 Land redistribution process 
Zimbabwe’s land reform process may be divided into three periods.117 The 
period between 1980 and 1992, which was characterised by the relatively 
secure predominance of the market method; the period between 1992 and 1999 
which was characterised by the beginning of an official challenge to the market 
method and the beginning of a real threat of compulsory acquisition, and lastly, 
2000 to 2002, the period in which the market method was resolutely abandoned 
and replaced by radical compulsory acquisition.  
 
1980-1992 First phase 
In 1980 the new government of Zimbabwe set out to acquire 8.3 million hectares 
of land on which to resettle 162 000 families under Phase One of its Land 
Reform and Resettlement Programme.118 Given the lack of planning, particularly 
with regard to support for relocated families, this was unrealistic.119 Between 
1980 and 1989 it acquired only 2.6 million hectares and resettled 52 000 
households, 70 per cent of these by 1983.  
 
The government’s land redistribution programme was based on the willing 
seller-willing buyer principle, a market mechanism of voluntary sales by owners 
and voluntary purchase by the government and was in keeping with the 
constitutional provisions which entrenched property rights. The principle ensured 
that whites only sold land that had been abandoned during the War of 
Liberation, or else was of poor quality, thereby denying new settlers the 
                                               
117 S Moyo and P Yeros ‘Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National 
Democratic Revolution’ in Moyo and Yeros (eds) Reclaiming the Land: The resurgence of rural 
movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America (2005) at 182. 
118 NH Thomas ‘Land reform in Zimbabwe’ (2003) 24 Third World Quarterly 691,712 






opportunity to establish a successful economic sector.120 Nonetheless, this was 
the structural context in which the government embarked on a programme 
whose centrepiece was the resettlement of the poor and landless.  
 
What distinguished this phase of gradual land redistribution from the later ‘fast 
track’ phase was its peaceful and orderly character.121  The process of selecting 
settlers for resettlement was, by and large, transparent, and the resettlement 
process itself was carried out under an intensive programme of limited scope 
which made use of detailed planning, a systematic procedure of settler 
selection, large amounts of specialist inputs, and provision of a wide range of 
infrastructure and supporting services to assist the new communities.122 
Families selected for resettlement were assigned arable land and residential 
plots on a random basis, utilising primarily the areas made available from 
amalgamating former commercial farms.123 
 
In all, during this first decade, the government reduced the white commercial 
farming sector to 11 million hectares, constituting 29 per cent of agricultural 
land.124 At this stage, the resettlement of families displaced by the independence 
struggle had largely been completed, and growing stability reduced the 
availability of affordable land for additional policy purposes. The government, 
which had failed to put in place a systematic approach to overall agricultural 
policy, directly scaled back its commitments to land redistribution.125 Over the 
period between1980 and1992, market-driven land reform proved its inability to 
deliver on Zimbabwe’s land question.126 The process was not only slow and 
incremental; it also delivered land of low agro-ecological value and imposed 
onerous fiscal demands on an already financially constrained state.127 The slow 
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and misdirected nature of the land reform process would become, from the mid-
1980s onwards, a source of bitter diplomatic conflict between the governments 
of Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom.128 
 
1992-1999 
Toward the end of the first decade of majority rule in Zimbabwe, there were 
troubling signs that land distribution and access were being tilted in favour of the 
new black elite who were connected to the ZANU-PF leadership and who were 
able to take advantage of the lack of clear guidelines for the land reform 
programme. As a result, the United Kingdom suspended disbursements to the 
first phase of the land programme in 1989.129 Consequently, the momentum for 
land reform lost steam in the 1990s, which have been described as a lost 
decade for land programmes in Zimbabwe.130 The official explanation for the 
slowdown in reform in the 1990s was that land acquired through the ‘willing 
seller-willing buyer’ approach had become more expensive for government to 
purchase.131 
 
After the expiration of the Lancaster House agreement in 1990 the government 
amended its constitution to allow for compulsory acquisition of land with “little 
compensation and limited rights of appeal to the courts”.132 The amendment did 
not, in effect, implement such acquisition or replace the market method.133 The 
three models- popular, market and state- would interact dynamically over the 
decade of structural adjustment.134 There followed, in 1991 a Land Acquisition 
Act to facilitate the purchase of farms. However, at this stage donor pressure 
ensured that the Lancaster House ‘willing seller’ condition persisted, and with 
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escalating land prices, this meant that very little land redistribution actually 
occurred.135 
 
Land occupations by war veterans began on a small scale in 1999, but lessened 
after government assurances that resettlement would be speeded up.136 
However, in February 2000 a draft constitution, which included a clause to make 
compulsory acquisition easier was rejected in a national referendum, and this is 
said to have angered the war veterans still further.137 This, combined with the 
fact that only 90 000 hectares of land (as opposed to the planned one million 
hectares a year) were resettled between 1998 and 2000, was the motivation 
behind the massive land occupations that occurred from February 2000.138 
 
2000-2002 Fast track land reform  
In response to the fact that little land had been redistributed, in May 2000 a 
change to the law was announced to allow the confiscation of land.139 This was 
the start of the government’s Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme.140 The 
stated aim of the fast track program is to take land from rich white commercial 
farmers for redistribution to poor and middle-income landless black 
Zimbabweans.141 The process of allocating plots to those who want land has 
frequently discriminated against those who are believed to support opposition 
parties, and in some cases those supervising the process have required 
applicants to demonstrate support for the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF).142  
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Because the "fast track" process of resettlement is being carried out so rapidly 
and is short-circuiting legal procedures, even those people allocated plots on 
former commercial farms appear in many cases to have little security of tenure 
on the land, leaving them vulnerable to future partisan political processes or 
eviction on political grounds, and further impoverishment.143 Overall, it has been 
found that the fast track program has violated rights to equal protection of the 
law, non-discrimination, and due process. The violence accompanying land 
occupations has created fear and insecurity on white-owned commercial farms, 
in black communal areas, and in "fast track" resettled areas, and threatens to 
destabilize the entire Zimbabwean countryside.  
4.3 Conclusion of discussion on Zimbabwe                                                
This section provided a broad canvas of the land reform situation in Zimbabwe, 
beginning with the central role that land issues took in the political arena at 
independence and the implementation of a willing seller-willing buyer land 
reform programme as a result of the Lancaster House agreement. This chapter 
also demonstrated the consequences of a failed willing seller-willing buyer 
based programme, which fuelled the drastic state-led fast- track land reform 
approach currently favoured by the government. While it is unlikely that South 
Africa would resort to the same ends (due to constitutional constraints), it is 
nevertheless a cautionary tale that the government must heed when determining 
which model to employ to achieve their target.                                                                                     
 
4.4 Introduction to land reform in Namibia 
The key role of land in Namibia is easily demonstrated by the fact that 90 per 
cent of the population derives their livelihood from the land as commercial or 
subsistence farmers or workers employed on commercial farms.144 The 
government of the new Republic of Namibia inherited two agricultural sub-
                                               
143 Ibid. 
144 B de Villiers, Land Reform: Issues and Challenges. A comparative overview of experiences in 






sectors, namely communal and commercial agriculture, which constituted 
parallel agricultural systems that not only divided Namibia almost equally in 
terms of land utilisation, but also reflected the racial division in the country at the 
time of independence.145  
After independence in 1990 the government was forced to address the 
inequitable access to commercial land ownership. Realising the importance that 
land would play in the development of the country and eradication of poverty 
resolved that a national consultation on the way forward was necessary.146 This 
resulted in the 1991 National Conference on Land Reform and the Land 
Question, an important milestone on the road to land reform which defined the 
manner in which government would implement reform in both commercial and 
communal agricultural areas.147 
At the conference, the new government adopted a policy aimed at redressing 
Namibia’s history of skewed land ownership through a process of national 
reconciliation and in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the Namibian 
Constitution, which stipulated just compensation for any private land acquired.148 
Realising that there was public demand for land redistribution, the government 
adopted the willing seller-willing buyer approach as the primary means of land 
acquisition.149 Land reform took the shape of resettling small-scale farmers and 
the establishment of a scheme for emergent black farmers to acquire large-scale 
farms.150 The 1991 Land Conference furthermore established a platform from 
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which the land reform programme, policies and legislation were to be 
developed.151  
The Namibian land reform process is based on two main legal statements, 
namely the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act152 and the (Communal) 
Land Reform Act.153 This section will only discuss land reform in light of the 
Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, as the willing seller-willing buyer 
principle is endorsed by this Act.  
 
4.4.1 Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995                                                                   
This was the first major piece of legislation on land reform in Namibia, and was 
not passed until 1995. The Act established a legal framework for the acquisition 
of lands by the state for resettlement purposes, following the willing buyer-willing 
seller principle.154 According to this principle, commercial farmers who were 
willing to sell their ranches freely offered them to the government. Thereafter, an 
official commission would visit the farms and decide whether or not to buy them, 
depending on the quality and suitability of the land for resettlement purposes.  
The Act contains a number of provisions to ensure that the market would 
perform as expected. These provisions include a requirement that any 
commercial farm offered for sale is offered to the Government first for the 
purposes of resettlement.155 It also contains a provision against ownership of 
multiple land holdings by a single individual. The Act ensures that land is 
available for redistribution by including a provision against ownership of 
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commercial farmland by non-Namibians.156 Lastly, the Act provides for the 
creation of a Land Reform Advisory Commission to advise the Government on 
the suitability of farms it wants to purchase and to resolve disputes arising from 
other parts of the Act.157 A land tax passed as part of efforts to achieve land 
reform was introduced by the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Second 
Amendment Act 2 of 2001. It provided for the payment, by every owner of 
commercial agricultural land, of a land tax based on the value (known as the 
Unimproved Site Value) of the land. The aim of this tax is to penalise 
unproductive farmers, obliging them to sell to the state and making more lands 
available for resettlement.158 It is a progressive tax that persuades individuals to 
give up some of their land units because they cannot afford to pay tax, and also 
creates revenue to buy more commercial agricultural land for the resettlement 
programme.159 This tax has so far not been collected, although the necessary 
procedures were introduced in April 2002.  
4.4.2 The effect of the legislation 
The pace of the Namibian reform process has, at best, been gradual and 
cautious.160 By November 2003, an estimated 6600 families consisting of about 
37000 people had been resettled under the willing seller-willing buyer policy. In 
general, it has been argued that the pace of reform is bound to continue being 
slow.161 The main reason for this assertion is that the political balance of forces 
is stacked against the landless and dispossessed in particular. This, it is argued, 
is in turn related to the differential impact land dispossession had on indigenous 
communities.162 Dispossession affected only pastoralists, who practised 
transhumance. Communities in the north-central and north eastern regions who 
practiced cultivation and animal husbandry were never dispossessed of their 
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land.163 Instead, colonial policies limited their mobility through the establishment 
of artificial boundaries.164 It is suggested that for these reasons, redistributive 
land reform never loomed large in the minds of the majority of these 
communities, as other issues, such as the provision of water, were more 
pressing.165 Thus, it has been argued that the land question in Namibia did not 
occupy as central a place in the liberation struggle as politicians would like 
people to believe.166 
 
In addition, the dispossessed in Namibia constitute a small minority of the 
population.167 Mixed farmers in the north-central and north-eastern regions not 
only constitute the vast majority of Namibians, but also form the main 
constituency of the ruling party, SWAPO. It is argued that the dispossessed, in 
turn, are not well organised, and thus do not wield any bargaining power.168 The 
ruling party is therefore under very little political pressure to accelerate the 
process of land redistribution. 
The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act was amended in July 2003, 
empowering the government to expropriate land "in the public interest", subject 
to "the payment of just compensation" in terms of section 20 of the Act.169 In 
2004 the government announced that the expropriation of agricultural land was 
to be implemented in order to speed up the land reform process.170 The 
government’s argument at the time was that the willing seller-willing buyer 
approach was to blame for inflating market related land prices, which 
consequently led to the unavailability of productive agricultural land.171 Thus, the 
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(Commercial) Land Reform Amendment Bill has started a new era in the land 
reform process, eroding the willing buyer-willing seller principle.  
4.5 Conclusion of discussion on Namibia 
As was the case in Zimbabwe, redistributive reform in Namibia was seen as a 
prerequisite for successful rural development and economic stability. The willing 
seller-willing buyer approach was initially favoured as the primary means of 
redistribution, but, as discussed in the chapter, despite the existence of 
adequate mechanisms put in place for its implementation, the policy was later 
abandoned in favour of expropriation. This discussion on Namibia demonstrates 
that one of the main stumbling blocks on the way to the achievement of effective 
land reform is a lack of prioritisation. The main impetus for land reform in 
Namibia came from the dispossessed, who constituted a small minority and had 
little bargaining power. 
 
4.6 Conclusion on Zimbabwe and Namibia 
Overall, this chapter has shown that the willing seller-willing buyer policy has 
failed as a means of achieving fast delivery for land redistribution. It is argued 
that a speedier, more effective process is needed to assuage the needs of the 
majority and to demonstrate that issues of previous dispossession are being 
addressed. Zimbabwe and Namibia both abandoned redistribution programmes 
based on the willing seller willing buyer policy in favour of state-initiated 
expropriation, and it suggested that South Africa should be able to relate to their 
experiences. It is argued that these two countries provide a strong case for the 
move away from the willing seller-willing buyer policy and towards the adoption 
of a more active state-led reform based on constitutional expropriation. The next 
chapter shifts the focus of the paper back onto South Africa, and examines the 












The previous chapter discussed the land reform programmes adopted by the 
post-colonial governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia and found that  while both 
had begun with a policy of market-based negotiations based reform, this was 
abandoned relatively early on in the reform process, in favour of a more state-
centred expropriation policy. This chapter will begin with an overview of the 
government’s redistribution programme before moving onto and focusing on the 
willing seller-willing buyer policy. It will demonstrate that the willing seller-willing 
buyer approach is not a workable option for expedient land redistribution in 
South Africa.  
 
5.2 Overview of the South African land redistribution programme  
According to the government’s White Paper172, the responsibility for land reform 
lies with the national government and requires it to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of land, to support the work of the Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights and to implement of land tenure and land administration reform.173 
In formulating its land reform policy, the government is said to have 
endeavoured to take account of the widely conflicting demands of the various 
stakeholders and the implications of any specific course of action on the land 
market and investment in South Africa. These included arguments from those 
who favoured drastic state intervention to redistribute land and those who 
insisted that land should be allocated only to those who can prove that they can 
use it productively. Essentially, government’s main challenge was to find a way 
of redistributing land to the needy, and at the same time maintaining public 
confidence in the land market. 
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The land reform programme that emerged out of the negotiations and policy 
debates of the early 1990s attempted to meld a strong commitment to the goals 
of social justice with the principles of market-led land reform.174  The 
redistribution programme was initiated by the (then) more or less newly created 
Department of Land Affairs as one of three pillars of land reform, the other two 
being land restitution and tenure reform.175 The Department of land Affairs 
operates within the broader context of the government’s social and economic 
transformation agenda and contributed towards the achievement of the aims 
and objectives of the national government.176 One of these objectives is that of 
ensuring the delivery of 30 per cent of white-owned agricultural land by 2014.177 
 
5.2.1 Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) 
The redistribution programme commenced in 1995, and was based on a flat 
grant of R15 000 per household (on a par with the housing grant) for the 
acquisition of land and start up capital. This grant was known as the 
Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant, or SLAG and was, according to the White 
Paper, primarily aimed at the benefiting the rural poor.178 Initially, the primary 
aim of the programme -as well as the rationale for the small size of the grant- 
was to cater for the need for secure residential tenure as well as land with which 
to contribute to one’s sustenance.179 Although still inadequate, the pace of 
delivery accelerated rapidly between 1995 and March 1999. Over this period, 
roughly 60 000 households were allocated grants for land acquisition, of which 
20 000 benefited in the 1998/1999 year alone. Altogether, around 650 000 
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hectares were approved for redistribution by March 1999, representing less than 
one percent of the country’s commercial farmland.180  
 
Apart from insufficient delivery, as of 1999 the Department of Land Affairs was 
just beginning to reach a critical level of awareness that a high proportion of its 
redistribution projects were plagued with serious problems. Much attention 
focused on the fact that groups were too large and post-transfer support was 
poor.181 These problems led to the formation of a revised programme for 
redistribution. 
 
5.2.2 Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
The new redistribution programme, entitled Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development, or LRAD, was based on a model actively promoted by staff of the 
World Bank, drawing on their recent experiences in Brazil and Colombia.182 It 
became official policy in November 2000 under the title of ‘Land Redistribution 
for Agricultural Development: A Sub-programme of the Land Redistribution 
Programme’.183 According to the Integrated Program of Land Reform and 
Agricultural Development, the LRAD is designed to provide grants to black 
South African citizens to access land specifically for agricultural purposes.184 
One of the objectives of the LRAD is to contribute to the government’s 
redistribution target of the delivery of 30 per cent of agricultural by 2014.185  
 
Whether LRAD represented a broadening of the redistribution programme, or a 
wholesale shift, remains an issue of contention.186 One of the primary 
differences from the old programme is that the grant is available in a range from 
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R20 000 up to R100 000, depending on an own contribution which rises 
disproportionately according to the grant level (that is from R5 000 to R400 
000).187 However, as significant as the change in the size of the grant is the fact 
that it is now awarded to adult individuals rather than to households, and in 
practice multiple adult members of the same household can apply for LRAD 
grants with the intention of pooling them.188  
 
Own contributions by beneficiaries in labour can be up to R5 000 per applicant 
(individual). In order for the applicant to claim the full R5 000 in own labour 
towards the own contribution requirement, the business plan must show 
evidence that the applicant intends to devote a significant amount of own labour 
towards the establishment and operation of the project.189 The contribution in 
kind could be calculated by costing assets such as machinery, equipment, 
livestock, and other assets that a beneficiary may possess. The cash 
contribution can be in the form of one’s own cash contribution to the project, or 
borrowed capital, or some combination of the two. These three forms of own 
contribution can be added in any combination to make up the required own 
contribution from the beneficiary.190 Beneficiaries select the position on the scale 
at which they wish to enter LRAD, determined by their objectives and ability to 
leverage the grant with their own resources.191 
 
Most redistribution projects have involved groups of applicants pooling their 
grants to buy formerly white-owned farms for commercial agricultural purposes, 
although under LRAD there is a move towards smaller, often family-based, 
groups. Less commonly, groups of farm-workers have used the grant to 
purchase equity shares in existing farming enterprises.192 Since 2001, state land 
under the control of national and provincial departments of agriculture has also 
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been made available for purchase. A separate grant, the Grant for the 
Acquisition of Municipal Commonage, has been made available to municipalities 
wishing to provide communal land for use by the poor, typically for grazing 
purposes. By the end of 2001, a total of 834 redistribution projects, in all 
categories, had been implemented or approved countrywide, involving 96 000 
households.193 
 
Limited budgets have certainly limited the impact of redistribution to date.194 
While land reform is a government priority, its budgetary allocation to the DLA 
suggests otherwise, and is evident in the small percentage of funds allocated to 
the DLA budget. For example, in the 2001 to 2002 financial year, the DLA 
received less than half a percent (0.37 per cent) of the total national budget. 
This allocation decreased further in the following financial year (from 2002 to 
2003) to 0.33 per cent of the total national budget.195 It has been suggested that 
with this low spending base, the total national budget increases more 
significantly in real terms (9 per cent) in comparison to the total DLA national 
budget (-0.13 per cent) over the 2001 to 2005 period. It has also been indicated 
that the DLA national budget decreases by 7 per cent in real terms from the 
previous financial year.196 This means that the DLA had fewer funds available 
between 2002 and 2003 than in the previous financial year and suggests, 
overall, that there is limited scope for the DLA to reduce poverty with its land 
reform programme.197 
 
The method of land acquisition and transfer implied by the ‘demand-led’ 
approach means that land must be acquired farm by farm, involving numerous 
uncoordinated negotiations between landowners, buyers and the state. Not only 
is this time-consuming and complex, it also allows for little or no overall control 
or coordination over the location and sequencing of land transfers. This makes it 
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next to impossible for local government and other support agencies to anticipate 
future needs and plan accordingly.198 Encouraging moves towards the inclusion 
of land reform within local development plans are evident in a minority of 
municipalities, but are likely to be hampered by reliance on the market to provide 
the necessary land. Overall, it has been argued that the new redistribution 
programme (i.e. the LRAD) is decidedly market-friendly, and fully embraces the 
willing seller-willing buyer approach that was adopted in 1994.199 
 
5.3 The willing seller-willing buyer policy (WSWB) 
As was discussed in previous chapters, the framework for the government’s land 
reform policy is set out in the White Paper on South African Land Policy 
released in April 1997, which has been viewed as the official statement of 
government policy on land.200 The objectives of the White Paper included 
corrections of past injustices; generating reconciliation and stability; the 
promotion of economic growth; and the improvement of the quality of life of 
people through the alleviation of poverty.201  
 
It has been argued that while all three aspects of the land reform programme 
(land redistribution, land tenure and land restitution) are ultimately derived from 
the Constitution, it is the redistribution programme which is widely seen as giving 
effect to section 25(5).202 The White Paper clearly sets out the purpose of the 
redistribution programme and states that: 
 
The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to 
land for residential and productive uses, in order to improve their income and quality of 
life. The programme aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women, as 
well as emergent farmers. Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing 
buyer willing seller arrangements. Government will assist in the purchase of land, but 
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will in general not be the buyer or owner. Rather, it will make land acquisition grants 
available and will support and finance the required planning process. In many cases, 
communities are expected to pool their resources to negotiate, but and jointly hold land 
under a formal title deed. Opportunities are also offered for individuals to access the 
grant for land acquisition.203 
 
As stated in the White Paper, land redistribution has been characterised by the 
application of the willing seller-willing buyer principle which has meant assisting 
previously excluded groups to enter the existing land market, alongside other 
actors, without diminishing either the rights of those who have historically 
enjoyed favourable access to the land market, or the rights of existing land 
owners.204 The concept of the willing seller-willing buyer principle has dominated 
the discourse on land reform in South Africa since 1994, and as seen in the 
quote above, can indeed be described as one of the defining characteristics of 
the programme.205  
 
5.3.1 A critique of the willing seller-willing buyer concept  
Do these parties exist?  
In general, the willing seller- willing buyer (WSWB) principle denotes a 
completely voluntary transaction between a seller and a buyer.206 It has been 
argued by some that in the South African context this general exposition of the 
principle is somewhat different. This is because the land owner is not a willing 
seller and the government cannot be characterised as a willing buyer because it 
has a legal duty to buy and restitute the land to the valid claimant.207 Thus, in 
this context, WSWB refers to an imaginary ideal rather than an actual 
practice.208 
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Because of the WSWB principle, the pace of redistribution is effectively 
determined by numerous uncoordinated negotiations between land owners and 
would-be purchasers.209 Commercial farmers own most of the land, and a small 
fraction is in the custody of the state. In many instances, these farmers are 
reluctant to release land to willing buyers. It has been contended that this is 
done to curtail aspiring emergent farmers.210 The purchase of land in South 
Africa is market based, and the sellers tend to overprice land, thus making it 
impossible for some buyers to acquire land.211  
 
Due to the fact that it is government officials rather than beneficiaries who 
engage in the negotiations, attempts at redistribution of land are often being 
thwarted because these negotiations have the effect of driving up the price.212 It 
is argued that government officials are not keen to walk away from the 
negotiations due to the time invested and the fact that there are targets that 
need to be met. The result is that land owners tend to exploit this and demand 
exorbitant prices.213 
 
The concept of WSWB also appears to have been influenced by the course of 
land reform in Zimbabwe.214 As was seen in chapter 4, in the Zimbabwean 
context, the concept of WSWB initially represented a state-led approach, 
whereby land would be acquired through a mix of expropriation (effectively 
nationalisation) and negotiated purchase, with compensation paid at the 
equivalent of market prices.215 The intended beneficiaries (i.e. the landless) 
were not directly involved in the transaction, and could not therefore constitute a 
‘willing buyer’, as this role was reserved for the state alone.216  
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It has been argued that in the South African context of land reform the concept 
of WSWB has come to mean something quite distinct. The sellers are again 
private land owners, but the choice available to them is not simply to sell or not 
sell to government as it was in Zimbabwe. Rather, owners are free to sell to the 
highest bidder or the buyer of their choice.217 Thus, South African landowners 
can actively avoid offering their land for sale for land reform purposes (for 
instance on racist grounds) yet still dispose of their land on the ‘open market’. 
This is because the state does not have the right of first refusal and the intended 
beneficiaries have to compete for available land on open market at market 
prices.  
 
WSWB as a hindrance to effective land redistribution  
The doctrine of WSWB as it is used in the South African context entails that the 
whole concept is transferred from the state to the intended beneficiaries.218 
However, as seen above, simple ‘willingness’ on the part of landless people is 
no guarantee that they will be able to secure the land that they need. This is 
because people in need of land are dependent not only on the cooperation of 
the landowners, but also on the willingness of the state to approve their 
application and provide the necessary funding.  
 
The negotiated settlement saw an accommodation of the interests of large 
commercial farming interests, through the acceptance of a willing seller-willing 
buyer ‘market-assisted’ approach to land acquisition and distribution, and a shift 
from seeing rural community members as ‘active agents within local struggles’ 
whose efforts to ‘mobilise and organise’ should be supported, to portraying them 
as ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘clients’ with varying needs or demands for land that the 
government should ‘facilitate’ the expression of.219 Essentially, it is argued that 
the state became the locus of key decision making on land, even when it 
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consulted stakeholders, or outsourced functions to providers. The stage was 
thus set for a ‘state-centred’ politics of land reform.220 
 
Lahiff points out that while the state has (in theory) the power and the resources 
to enter the land market on behalf of beneficiaries, it has chosen not to do so. 
Rather, it provides grants to would-be beneficiaries who themselves must enter 
the market, identify a ‘willing seller’ (i.e. property that is for sale) and secure an 
agreement from the owner to sell at an agreed price.221 However, the problem 
with using the doctrine of WSWB as a tool for redistributive reform appears to lie 
in the fact that the ‘willing buyer’ and ‘willing seller’ as concepts do not receive 
equal regard and protection. It is argued that if a ‘willing buyer’ is said to exist, it 
may refer neither to the state (which does not buy land on its own behalf or 
initiative) nor to the intended beneficiaries. Rather, it represents an abstract 
concept which is essentially a hybrid of state and would-be beneficiaries, 
supposedly acting in unison.222 ‘Willing seller’, on the other hand, accurately 
denotes the lack of compulsion on landowners, while ‘willing buyer’, as noted 
before, offers no guarantees to the landless that that they will acquire the land 
they want, or indeed any land at all.223 While the willing seller component (i.e. 
the cooperation of land owners) has been described by proponents of market-
led agrarian reforms as the most important factor for any successful 
implementation of land reform, 224 it is contended here that this in itself is one of 
the reasons for the weakness of the policy.  
 
Moreover, the concept of ‘willing seller’ (and the payment of market prices) fully 
protects the interests of existing landowners as it neither compels them to sell 
against their will nor at a price with which they are not fully satisfied.225 The 
same privilege cannot be said to apply to landless people as no such 
                                               
220 Ibid. 
221 Lahiff (note 205 above) 2. 
222 Ibid.  
223 Ibid. 
224 Borras (note 89 above) 370. 






guarantees or protections are afforded to them. They continue to depend on 
state approval of their grant applications and on the willingness of owners to 
transact with them.226 This has led to the poignant and harsh conclusion that the 
South African land reform programme can best be described as a ‘willing seller’ 
programme.227 
 
Ultimately, it is argued that social justice is not just about restitution, but about 
the way in which one conducts redistribution, and that the social justice 
undercurrent to redistribution very likely also accounts for the rejection of the 
whole willing seller-willing buyer concept, which confers on white farmers 
generally the power to decide what land will and will not be made available to 
blacks.228 In South Africa, where a text-book example of World Bank-inspired 
redistribution forms the centre-piece of land reform policy, the severe limitations 
of the market-based approach are plainly evident. It is argued that this, perhaps 
ironically, has less to do with failures of ‘the market’ or of current landowners to 
part with their property, than the very limited assistance made available by the 
state to the landless, and the refusal to proactively engage in the land market in 
order to secure outcomes favourable to the mass of the rural poor.229 Thus, 
market-based redistribution becomes piecemeal redistribution, securing benefits 
for a lucky few but leaving the fundamental structures of the agrarian economy, 
and the problems of mass rural poverty and landlessness, largely intact.230   
 
The willing seller-willing buyer approach is also considered objectionable in that 
it puts people in the position of ‘buying back their own land, even if the money 
largely comes from the state.231  It has been argued that the provisions in the 
willing seller-willing buyer approach effectively insulate white South Africans 
from any costs associated with restitution, and place the burden on South 
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Africans as a whole.232 While this is in keeping with the country’s philosophy 
based on principles of restorative and not punitive justice, the objection may be 
raised that land restitution and redistribution, while remedying one injustice, 
creates a new injustice, to the extent that the innocent are asked to pay for the 
crimes of the guilty.233 Frustrations over the pace of land reforms have led to 
fears that South Africa will run in to farm invasion problems, along the lines of 
what transpired in Zimbabwe.234 
 
5.4 Analysis of government action  
As indicated previously in the paper, the land reform programme has been 
affected by various institutional issues. From the beginning, the Department of 
Land Affairs’ (DLA) task was acknowledged as being a mammoth one.235 It was 
required to meet the very high expectations of rapid land reform among the 
newly enfranchised majority, to draft and guide through an unfamiliar 
parliamentary process the legislation to achieve this and to develop the 
institutional structures and operating systems to support its work.236 
Furthermore, the DLA’s lack of staff capacity has been a continuing constraint, 
and, as the public demands for lands reform increase, a source of major 
concern. It has also been argued that in its early years, the DLA was further 
handicapped by the isolationism of government departments, often finding that it 
was working at cross-purposes with other departments, especially at the 
provincial and local level.237 Walker argues that the complexity of the institutional 
task was unanticipated by the advocates of land reform- and that even today 
politicians, policy-makers and the public still grossly underestimate the multi-
dimensional capacity needed for effective implementation.238 
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It can thus be suggested that government has demonstrated a lack of political 
will when it comes to land reform and redistribution. This has manifested itself in 
the ‘passive’ role that government has taken in redistribution negotiations, and 
has been argued to be a contributing factor in the slow pace of delivery. As 
discussed in previous sections, the government’s role under the willing seller-
willing buyer approach is limited to funding, and therefore means that no 
responsibility is taken by government for identifying land or initiating negotiations 
with landowners. This has led to the suggestion that a much more active and 
intermediary role is required of the government. Government’s new ‘active’ role 
would require that an unambiguous message is sent out stating that it is truly 
committed to reaching land redistribution targets, and fixing the Department of 
Land Affairs’ highly bureaucratic process, while addressing the question of the 
department’s lack of human and financial resources.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an overview of the government’s land redistribution 
programme where the target of delivering 30 per cent of white owned 
agricultural land by 2014 was noted. This was followed by an examination of 
move from SLAG to LRAD which could also be characterised as a shift to a 
more commercial, market-based programme. The discussion also brought to the 
fore many problematic issues that arise in the willing seller-willing buyer policy of 
land redistribution. As the previous chapter on Zimbabwe and Namibia showed, 
this is not a problem inherent only to South Africa.  While the willing seller-willing 
buyer policy aims at assisting previously excluded groups to enter the land 
market, the issues of inequality between ‘willing sellers’ and ‘willing buyers’ led 
to the conclusion that the policy was essentially a ‘willing seller’ policy. Thus it is 
concluded that the market-based willing seller-willing buyer policy is not the 
preferred approach for government as it will not lead to substantial change in 
land distribution, and that what is needed is a more involved approach. The next 
chapter discusses the provisions relating to expropriation in the Constitution, 







VI. EXPROPRIATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION:  




As has been highlighted in previous chapters, one of the key challenges that 
confront South Africa today is the alleviation of massive poverty, unemployment 
and underdevelopment that continue to exist in the country.239  It has been 
argued that given the imbalances that resulted from dispossession in South 
Africa, there was no way judicial restitution or redistribution of land could take 
place without the possibility of the expropriation of privately owned land.240  
This chapter will examine the constitutional provisions dealing with the state’s 
powers of expropriation and will consider the appropriate use of these provisions 
within a land reform context.  
 
6.2 Expropriation under the South African Constitution  
 
6.2.1 Section 25  
Section 25 of the Constitution deals with the question of expropriation, and 
reads as follows: 
 
25(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of a law of general application- 
 (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment 
of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a 
court. 
 
                                               
239 M Andrews ‘Struggling for Life in Dignity’ in R Hall and LNtsebeza (eds) The Land Question in 
South Africa: The Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution, (2007) 211. 
240 MA Yanou ‘Access to land as a human right: The payment of just and equitable compensation for 







25(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including- 
 (a) the current use of the property; 
 (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
 (c) the market value of the property; 
 (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property; and 
 (e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
 
6.2.2 What does expropriation entail? 
The definition of expropriation in the South African property clause was set out 
in the early Constitutional Court decision in Harksen v Lane NO.241 This case 
concerned the constitutional validity of an economic regulation provision that 
transferred assets of an insolvent’s spouse to the trustee of the insolvent estate 
until it was clear that property was not transferred from the insolvent estate to 
defraud creditors. The issue to be determined was essentially whether the 
regulatory transfer of property amounted to an unconstitutional expropriation.242 
The Constitutional Court defined expropriation as “the process whereby a public 
authority takes property (usually immovable) for a public purpose and usually 
against payment of compensation”.243 The Court also pointed out that the 
distinction between expropriation so defined and deprivation of property, which 
falls short of compulsory acquisition, has long been recognised in South African 
Law.244 It emphasised that an acquisition must permanently deprive the owner of 
the right in order to qualify as expropriation, implying that where the interference 
with rights in property is transient, it would amount to deprivation only.245  
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This is reiterated by Currie and De Waal, who argue that expropriation must be 
understood as a form of interference with property that has two 
characteristics.246 The first is that there must be some form of appropriation – 
taking of the property. Like the Constitutional Court, they note that as long as the 
rights are merely extinguished and are not acquired by the public authority, the 
extinction does not amount to an expropriation. Besides appropriation, the 
second characteristic of an expropriation is that it must be made with an 
expropriatory purpose.247 They argue that the fundamental injustice that a right 
to property seeks to prevent is the acquisition of a public benefit at private 
expense. Laws that permit the taking of property with this purpose in mind are 
expropriations, requiring the payment of compensation from public funds.248  
 
Section 25(2) does not remove the state’s power to expropriate property but 
subjects it to two constraints. The first is that an expropriation is permissible only 
for public purposes or in the public interest. It has been contended that read with 
section 25 (4)(a), which provides that the public interest includes the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa’s natural resources, the public interest requirement is 
unquestionably met when expropriations are undertaken for purposes of land 
redistribution.249 The second constraint imposed by section 25(2) is that an 
expropriation is subject to the payment of compensation for the property that has 
been taken. 
 
6.3 Compensation  
Compensation is at the heart of the expropriation analysis and has been 
described as an important aspect of expropriation, because without it, existing 
property rights would be infringed upon and one would be dealing with a 
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situation of confiscation.250 This was confirmed in First National Bank of South 
Africa t/a WESBANK v Minister of Finance,251 where Ackermann J stated that for 
a deprivation to amount to an expropriation it must pass scrutiny under section 
25(2)(a) and make provision for compensation under section 25(2)(b) of the 
Constitution.  
 
This raises the important question of how compensation is to be determined. 
The Constitution gives South African courts broad discretion in determining 
compensation.252 Courts do not simply determine the amount of compensation; 
they also determine the timing and manner of payment.253 Section 25(3) is 
supposed to guide the determination of compensation, but is widely accepted as 
being extremely vague.254 The subsection merely states that the three aspects 
of compensation (the amount, time and manner of payment) must be ‘just and 
equitable’ but does not clearly specify what precisely counts as ‘just and 
equitable’.  
 
The subsection only states that compensation should reflect an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In 
balancing these interests, the court must give regard to the pertinent 
considerations already listed above in section 25(3) (a)-(e) of the Constitution. 
The Constitution does not state in whose favour any particular factor should 
weigh.255 These factors, therefore, will be considered on a case-by-case basis 
and the party in whose favour a particular factor weighs will vary from one case 
to the next.256  
 
Also worth noting is that the balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected is an equitable one, rather than an equal one, which, 
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it is argued, gives the court additional flexibility in determining compensation.257 
While some factors will accordingly be given more weight than others depending 
on the particular facts, what is clear is that if expropriation is carried out for 
purposes of land reform, then compensation must reflect a just balance between 
concern for landowners and concern for those dispossessed of land and 
livelihood by the injustices of the nation’s past.258  
 
A combination of the existing land redistribution programme, based on the 
willing seller-willing buyer principle and government anxiety over compensation 
for land have led to the expropriation provision not being applicable in 
government redistribution policy thus far. The vague nature of the compensation 
formula in section 25 has not helped. It is imperative to the protection of rights 
and the facilitation of access to property for transformative purposes that the 
requirements for compensation are clarified, the state to fulfil its obligations.  
 
It has been argued that given the racist policy of the apartheid government, 
which explicitly favoured the interests of white over black citizens, perhaps the 
most critical factors in section 25(3) that are to be considered in terms of land 
reform expropriations are the history of the acquisition and use of the property, 
as well as the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition 
and capital improvement of the property.259 Taking account of these factors in 
calculating compensation would avoid windfalls for landowners who benefited 
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6.3.1 Case law on the calculation of compensation 
6.3.1.1 The so called Gildenhuys formula 
Ex Parte Former Highlands Residents 261 is the only reported case dealing with 
the interpretation of section 25 (3) of the Constitution and was referred to by the 
Cape High Court in Du Toit v Minister of Transport, 262which also dealt with the 
awarding of a compensation claim for state expropriation. In Ex Parte Former 
Highlands Residents, Gildenhuys J dealt with section 2 (2) of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1944 (in terms of which no person is entitled to restitution 
if just and equitable compensation in terms of section 25 (3) has been received 
in respect of the dispossession of land rights) by finding that the provisions of 
section 25 (3) are clearly intended to require that market value, while important, 
not be the conclusive and determinative factor in the assessment of just and 
equitable compensation.263  
 
Gildenhuys J found that the market value of the expropriated property does 
nonetheless play a central role in the determination of fair and equitable 
compensation, not least because it is, other than factor (d) regarding state 
subsidies, the only factor that is readily quantifiable. In this regard, however, he 
also noted that the requirement that financial loss be compensated can lift the 
compensation to above the market value, while public interest may reduce it.264 
He concludes by finding that in his view, the equitable balance required by the 
Constitution for a determination of just and equitable compensation will in most 
cases best be achieved by first determining the market value of the property and 
thereafter subtracting from or adding to the amount of the market value, as other 
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6.3.2 Implications of the Gildenhuys formula 
It has been argued that the same formula can be used as a guide even in land 
redistribution cases.266 In the context of expropriation, it would look as follows: 
Compensation = C – k0 ● (B - A) - E1● K1 - E 2● K2 - E 3● K3…267 
In essence, this formula only takes into account two of the considerations 
mentioned in section 25(3), namely, the market value of the property and the 
extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property.268 In a nutshell, the amount of 
compensation is the market value of the property minus the present value of 
past subsidies.269 This addresses the concern that the present market value of 
property would always be high and that payment of high compensation would 
mean that those who benefited under apartheid would continue to do so. By 
including the considerations enumerated in section 25(3), such a formulation for 
the determination of compensation also meets the ‘just and equitable’ 
requirement for compensation.  
 
6.4 Is expropriation the way forward? 
The White Paper stated that expropriation will be used as an instrument of last 
resort where urgent land needs cannot be met through voluntary market 
transactions and that it will be considered where there is no reasonable 
alternative land and the owner will not sell, or will not negotiate a fair price.270 It 
could be argued that the general view suggests that South Africa is possibly in 
such a situation now. The Department of Land Affairs’ recent discussion 
document proposes the use of extensive expropriation to meet the government’s 
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30 per cent redistribution target.271 Some suggest that expropriation is unlikely to 
result in cheaper or faster land reform, and instead echo the White Paper by 
suggesting that it should be reserved for the minority of difficult cases.272  
 
The government has previously been criticised for its apparent hesitation to use 
its expropriation powers for land reform purposes and for its seeming 
unwillingness to speed up land reform by expropriating land against 
compensation at less than market value.273 While it has been seen that the 
fundamentals, in terms of policy, are in place and have constitutional mandate, 
most commentators argue that what is missing is commitment from government 
to ensure that the policies are implemented.274 This allegation is often couched 
in terms of a lack of political will on the part of the South African government. As 
stated above, the government’s expropriation powers have been largely unused 
in redistribution cases, leading some to conclude that the property clause is itself 
not the immediate challenge but that the constraint is a political rather than a 
legal one.275 I 
 
It is important to note that where the state uses expropriation to meet the 
imperatives of section 25(4) of the Constitution, the strength for land and 
agrarian reform of expropriation lies in its threat.276 If the expropriation 
mechanism is used judiciously, the message that the state is serious about 
expediting the land and agrarian reform programme and is no longer prepared to 
indulge in unjustifiably prolonged negotiations will be internalised by the landed 
gentry and thus taken seriously.277 Therefore, it is argued that the state has to 
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demonstrate its resolve to acquire land in the most cost effective manner to 
accelerate land delivery.278 
 
6.5 Expropriation and the Zimbabwean Risk 
While the slow pace of reform is generally seen as a major contributor to rural 
unrest in Zimbabwe, the situation in South Africa is certainly no better.279 The 
emergence of land invasions in Zimbabwe occurred as it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that the land market was unlikely to lead to a speedy 
transfer land to black farmers on a large scale, and certainly not on the scale 
which the government itself had pledged.280 In South Africa, across the three 
key areas of government land policy – restitution, redistribution and tenure 
reform – progress has been painstakingly slow, and the Department of Land 
Affairs has repeatedly failed to spend its allocated budget for land acquisition.281 
While some critics have attributed this to resistance from white landowners, or to 
the protection afforded to private property in the Constitution, a growing 
consensus also points to a combination of poor programme design and a lack of 
capacity at all levels of government.282 As discussed above, this has led to calls 
for a shift in government policy, namely, towards the use of constitutionally 
endorsed expropriation in the area of land reform.  
 
Expropriation is nothing new, and the South African government regularly 
expropriates numerous properties each year for public purposes such as roads 
and dam construction.283  But, the expropriation of land from one private owner 
to transfer it to another, in the interests of land reform, is something new.284 As 
stated above, there are fears that South Africa will run in to farm invasion 
problems, along the lines of what transpired in Zimbabwe. However, it has been 
argued that comparisons with Zimbabwe’s large-scale confiscation of farms are 
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spurious, and that there is no indication that expropriation is to be used as 
anything other than a method of last resort.285 
 
It has been argued that beyond all the hype, the events in Zimbabwe do not 
appear to pose a threat for South Africa and that the poor and landless in South 
Africa have not yet followed the example of the war veterans in Zimbabwe.286 
The South African government, constrained by the market-friendly prescriptions 
of the RDP has gone to great lengths to assuage the concerns of private 
landowners and foreign investors.287  
 
In fact, expropriation has so far only been countenanced as a way to deal with 
restitution and not in the wider process of land redistribution. Furthermore, unlike 
Zimbabwe, South Africa has the legal and institutional mechanisms to provide 
oversight as the state intervenes in favour of the landless to settle historical 
claims.288 The forcible expropriation of land adopted by President Mugabe is 
contrary to the South African model, which privileges the rule of law in the 
resolution of a similar problem. It has a land claims commission, and land 
claimants and landowners have recourse to a specialist land claims court.289  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that there is constitutional endorsement of 
expropriation as a means of giving effect to land redistribution, and began by 
examining the expropriation provisions, and the meaning assigned to them 
through interpretation by the courts. This was followed by a discussion on the 
compensation requirement, which has been described as being at the heart of 
expropriation analysis, and the exposition on the Gildenhuys formula for 
determining the amount of compensation. The question of whether expropriation 
is the way forward led to the conclusion that South Africa may now be described 
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as being in a situation that requires the use of this ‘last resort’ tool. Lastly, it was 
concluded that while the situation in Zimbabwe has brought land redistribution 
politics to the fore, South Africa’s constitutional, legal and institutional 
































This dissertation considered the appropriateness of the South African 
government’s approach to land redistribution by reviewing the willing seller-
willing buyer policy. This involved an assessment of its effectiveness as the 
basis of the government’s land redistribution programme and as its main tool for 
redressing the imbalances of the past. It set out to demonstrate that a land 
redistribution programme premised on the willing seller-willing buyer policy is an 
unsuitable approach to speedy reform in South Africa and that a more active 
state-expropriation based approach is preferable. 
 
The study has established the basis for the discussion on the willing seller-
willing buyer policy by first examining the right to land and the significance of 
land reform. It has demonstrated that the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme’s statement on the centrality of land reform for the purposes of rural 
development was not only re-enforced by international instruments, but that it 
also found its basis in the Constitution’s provision of the legal authority 
empowering government to redistribute land.  Land reform in general and land 
redistribution in particular are significant for addressing issues of equality and 
alleviation of poverty. They are also necessary for the establishment of political 
stability and a secure society because they address the redistribution of wealth 
and power. Market-based redistributive reforms were also analysed, and it has 
been argued that while they are usually favoured as the primary mode of 
redistributive reform, this did not apply in the South African context, where the 
willing seller-willing buyer principle has failed to meet redistribution targets. 
 
This dissertation has also considered the application of market-based reforms in 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. This discussion has demonstrated that in order to be 
successful, the willing seller-willing buyer policy must be implemented in a 
strategic manner that keeps its primary objectives prioritised. This has not been 






willing seller-willing buyer approach; both abandoned the policy in favour of 
expropriation as the main basis for redistribution.  
 
The discussions on the application of the willing seller-willing buyer policy in 
South Africa and the possibility of using state expropriation as an alternative 
method raise the question of whether it is the structure of the redistribution 
programme that needs to be changed or whether the problems lies with 
implementation within those structures. In formulating its land reform policy, the 
government’s main challenge is to find a way of redistributing land to the needy, 
and at the same time maintaining public confidence in the land market. In this 
regard, one of the main criticisms levelled against the willing seller-willing buyer 
principle in is that the concept of ‘willing seller’ fully protects the interests of 
existing landowners by neither compelling them to sell against their will nor at a 
price with which they are not fully satisfied. The argument is that, by doing this, 
the policy favours landowners and essentially entrenches the consequences of 
the apartheid regime in post-apartheid society. As a result, it is questionable 
whether such a policy can satisfy both the need to protect property and ensure 
that there is an equitable distribution of land. 
 
Due to the shortcomings of the willing seller-willing buyer approach it is argued 
that a more interventionist approach to land reform in which state expropriation 
forms a central part, as endorsed by section 25 (2) and (3) of the Constitution, is 
necessary. If used judiciously, expropriation will send the message out that the 
state is serious about expediting the land reform programme and will also 
suggest that it is no longer satisfied with prolonged negotiations with land 
owners.  Expropriation is also in keeping with the initial goal of targeting the 
country’s rural poor through land reform. Under the market-based programme 
land reform took a more explicitly commercial orientation, as was evident in the 
fact that the previous income ceiling that applied under SLAG was replaced with 







As was contended in the paper, the willing seller-willing buyer approach grants 
enormous discretionary power to landowners to influence the pace and direction 
of land reform in South Africa. The decisions of both the Zimbabwean and 
Namibian governments to implement state-led expropriations to enable a more 
effective redistribution programme strongly support the same measure being 
taken by the South African government. Furthermore, a more carefully planned 
policy on expropriation would avert the problem of rushed reform, as 
experienced in Zimbabwe. Expropriation enables the state to reclaim the power 
over the implementation of land redistribution and ensures that sufficient land is 
made available in areas where it is most needed. It is argued that an 
interventionist and robust approach from the state based on section 25 (2) and 
(3) of the Constitution is what is needed to bring about the fundamental shift in 
property rights that is required and to effectively address the extreme inequality 
in landholding that currently prevails in South Africa; as well as ensuring that 
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